PUBLIC MARKS with tags attack & security

H4cktimes.com Siber Uzay'ın Haber Platformu

Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.

[tuesday, 02 august 2005] 轟炸人家的 bandwidth, 實非正人君子所為！ 單是八月一日的頭十小時間，便炸了2.7GB...抓破頭也想不明，為何連一個 small potato like me 都不放過？炸了我的網頁又如何？你們以為